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A psychological theory of perceived risk is developed. The theory is formulated in 
terms of an ordering of options, conceived of as probability distributions with respect 
to risk. It is shown that, under the assumptions of the theory, the risk of an option 
is expressible as a linear combination of its mean and variance. The relationships to 
other theories of risk and preference are explored. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The concept of risk has appeared in numerous investigations of decision making 
both as a descriptive and as an explanatory construct. No generally accepted definition 
of risk, however, has emerged from these investigations, nor have there been serious 
attempts to interrelate the various approaches to the study of risk. As a background 
for the present study, we sketch briefly the more salient directions of research. 
One approach to the study of risk is exemplified in the work of Coombs and his 
associates, (Coombs, 1964; Coombs and Huang, 1969; Coombs and Meyer, 1968; 
Coombs and Pruitt, 1960, Pruitt, 1962). Coombs has explored the variables affecting 
the perception of the riskiness of gambles as well as the manner in which perceived 
risk affects preferences among them. Coombs’ theory postulates that each individual 
has an ideal (or most preferred) risk level and that in choosing among lotteries with 
equal expectations the individual selects the lottery that is closest to his ideal risk level. 
The subject of risk taking has been of great interest not only to students of decision 
making, but also to students of personality and social psychology. Indeed, the tendency 
to seek or avoid risk has been investigated in numerous studies in relation to other 
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personality characteristics, situational variables, and group influences. For some 
reviews of this literature, see Cohen and Hansel (1956) Kogan and Wallach (1964,1967), 
and Slavic (1964). 
A very different approach to the study of risk can be found in the economic and the 
business literature that is concerned primarily with normative, rather than descriptive, 
issues. The problem of portfolio selection, for instance, is analyzed there in terms of 
the risks involved in each of the available courses of action; there risk is defined either 
in terms of the distribution of returns (e.g., Markowitz, 1959; Tobin, 1958) or in 
terms of properties of the utility function (e.g., Pratt, 1964). 
The various approaches to the study of risk share three basic assumptions. 1. Risk is 
regarded as a property of options, (e.g., gambles, courses of action) that affects choices 
among them. 2. Options can be meaningfully ordered with respect to their riskiness. 
3. The risk of an option is related in some way to the dispersion, or the variance, of its 
outcomes. (This last point was made as early as 1906 by the economist I. Fisher, and 
later restated by Allais (1953) . m h is critique of expected utility theory.) Beyond these 
basic assumptions, however, no general agreement concerning the nature of risk has 
been reached. Although various assumptions about the perception of risk have been 
introduced, they have not been derived from more basic principles, and they have 
typically been limited to restrictive contexts. 
The present paper investigates the perception of risk from the standpoint of 
measurement theory. It provides a quantitative explication of the concept of risk in the 
form of a psychological theory. The theory is formulated in terms of the ordering of 
options, characterized as probability distributions, with respect to risk. In the next 
section we introduce several assumptions about the risk ordering and show that they 
yield a ratio scale measure of risk. The implications of the results and their relations to 
other theories of risk and preference are discussed in the last section. 
II. MEASUREMENT OF RISK 
The theory is formulated in terms of a set S = {A, B, C,...] of probability distri- 
butions on the real line, interpreted as options or lotteries with monetary outcomes. 
Let 0 denote convolution of probability distributions. Thus, if A and B are two 
discrete distributions with values ai ,..., a, and b, ,..., b, obtained with probabilities 
Pl Y...? PTn and q1 ,..., qn , respectively, then A 0 B is the distribution with values ni + bj 
obtained with probabilities piqj for i = l,..., m, j = I,..., n. Considerable care should 
be taken in the empirical interpretation of 0. The distribution A 0 B, for example, 
corresponds to the lottery obtained by playing both A and B only if the two lotteries are 
independent. To illustrate, let A represent the lottery where one wins $100 if heads 
comes up and loses $100 if tails comes up, and let B represent the lottery where one 
wins $50 if heads comes up and loses $50 if tails comes up. Thus, A = (100, 4; - 100, 4) 
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and B = (50, $; -50, +), consequently, A o B = (150, t; 50, a; -50, a; -150, a). 
On the other hand, if the outcomes of the lotteries are both determined by a single 
toss of a coin, one must either win $150 or lose $150. Hence the distribution, 
(150, +; -150, +), th a corresponds to this joint lottery does not equal A 0 B. t 
The key concept of the present theory is a binary relation of comparative risk 
denoted >. Thus, A > B states that A is at least as risky as B, while A N B states 
that A and B are equally risky. This relation can be obtained directly by asking an 
individual to judge which of any pair of options is riskier, or by asking him to assign 
a number to each option reflecting its perceived risk. Alternatively, the above relation 
can be inferred from preferences via an appropriate substantive theory. It should be 
emphasized, however, that the risk ordering, which is the subject matter of our theory, 
need not be related to the preference ordering in any simple way. The assumptions of 
the theory should, thus, be evaluated according to the selected operational definition 
of > whatever its relations to preference may be. 
The axioms of the theory are incorporated into the definition of a risk system. Let S 
be the set of all probability distributions on the real line, and let o denote the binary 
operation of convolution. Clearly, 0 is associative, commutative and closed. Let > be 
a binary relation on S and define A > B whenever A + B but not B + A, and 
A N B whenever A + B and B > A. We use 4 to denote the distribution where the 
value zero is obtained with probability one. Clearly, A o $I = A for any A. 
The system (S, 0, 2) is a risk system if it satisfies the following axioms for all A, B, C, 
in S, 
Al WEAK ORDERING. > is connected and transitive. 
A2 CANCELLATION. A> BifandonlyifAoC> BaC. 
A3 SOLVABILITY. (i) if A > 4 for all A in S, then for any A > B there exists 
some C in S such that A N B 0 C. 
(ii) I f  4 > A for some A in S, then for any A in S there exists some B in S such 
that A 0 B = 4. 
A4 ARCHIMEDEAN. I f  A > B > 4 th en there exists some positive integer 
n such that n * B > A; where n * B is defined inductively: 1 * B = B, 
n*B=[(n-l)*B]oB. 
The first axiom is the usual ordering assumption which states that S can be weakly- 
ordered with respect to risk. The second axiom asserts that the risk ordering is com- 
patible with the operation, in the sense that order between any pair of distributions is 
preserved when a third distribution is convoluted with each of them. An equivalent 
version of the cancellation axiom is: A o C + B o C if and only if A o D > B 0 D. The 
cancellation axiom asserts, therefore, that if A is judged to be riskier than B in one 
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context (i.e., when combined with C), then it is judged to be riskier than B in any 
context. In particular, A2 implies that the risk ordering is independent of one’s 
financial position. Although the assumption that the ordering of options is independent 
of financial position appears to be too restrictive with respect to the preference ordering, 
it appears to be much more satisfactory with respect to the risk ordering. Axioms 1 
and 2 are the more interesting axioms from an empirical standpoint, since they capture 
basic ordinal properties that are readily testable. 
The solvability axiom has two parts that apply to different types of risk ordering. 
In the case where all the elements of S are at least as risky as 4, solvability states that 
when rZ is riskier than B then the risk of A can always be matched by combining B 
with some appropriate C. In the case where S contains some elements that are less 
risky than +, then solvability states that for any A one can always find some appropriate 
B such that d 0 B and4 are equally risky. Finally, the Archimedean axiom is introduced 
to ensure that no option is infinitely riskier than any other one, provided both options 
are riskier than+. Axioms 3 and 4, therefore, have a different status than Axioms 1 and 2 
because of their existential nature and their more technical character. 
The following representation theorem shows that if Axioms 1-4 hold, then one can 
construct an additive ratio scale that preserves the risk ordering. 
THEOREM I. If(S,o,>) . 1s a risk system then there exists a real-valued function, R, 
defined on S, such that for any A, B in S 
(i) =1 > B if and only if R(A) 3 R(B). 
(ii) R(A 0 B) = R(A) + R(B). 
(iii) I f  R’ is another function satisfying (i) and (ii), then R’(A) = olR(A) for some 
cy > 0. 
Proof. Two cases are considered: (a) A > 4 for all A in S, (b) $ > A for some A 
in S. In case (a) it is easy to verify that a risk system reduces to an extensive system of 
measurement (see Krantz, 1968; Suppes, 1951; Suppes and Zinnes, 1963) whence 
Theorem 1 follows from the standard representation theorem for extensive mea- 
surement. In fact, the only difference between the systems, in this case, lies in the 
existence of zero elements, but it follows from the present axioms, that if A > A 0 B 
then B N 4. 
In case (b) we show that the system (S/ N, 0, >) is a fully-ordered Archimedean 
group, where S/- denotes the set of equivalence classes of S modulo N. Let 
[A] = {B in S : A N B} be the equivalence class containing A, and define 
[d] 0 [B] = [iz 0 B], and [A] > [B] ‘f 1 and only if A > B. It is readily seen that 
both 0 and > on S/- are well-defined as they are independent of the representative 
elements that were chosen to define the equivalence classes. Clearly, S/- is closed 
under 0 which is, by definition, associative and commutative. Furthermore, [$] is the 
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identity element because [A] o [$] = [A 0 +] = [A] for any A in S. Since for any A 
there exists a B such that A 0 B N 4, by Axiom 3, we can define inverses by letting 
[Al-l = [B]. To establish uniqueness, suppose [A] 0 [B] = [A] o [C] = [+I; hence, 
by Axiom 2, [B] = [C] and the inverse is unique. Finally, > is a full (or a total) 
order on S/-, which is Archimedean, by Axiom 4, and satisfies the cancellation axiom. 
Consequently, (S/m, 0, 2) is a fully-ordered Archimedean group; hence, by Holder’s 
(1901) theorem (see Fuchs, 1963, p. 45) t i is order-isomorphic to a subgroup of the 
additive group of real numbers with the natural ordering. Moreover, the isomorphism 
can be shown (see Fuchs, 1963, p. 46) to be unique up to multiplication by a positive 
real number, which completes the proof of Theorem 1. 
Several comments about Theorem 1 are in order. First, it can be generalized by 
weakening some of the assumptions. In particular, one can use the results of Krantz 
(1968) and Lute and Marley (1968) t o extend the theorem to the case where the 
operation is restricted to some subset of S. Furthermore, the present solvability and 
Archimedean axioms can be replaced by a weaker though more complicated axiom, 
formulated by Roberts and Lute (1968), who obtained necessary and sufficient 
conditions for extensive measurement. A necessary and sufficient condition for the 
existence of an additive risk scale can also be derived following an approach developed 
by Tversky (1967a, b). Second, the proof of Theorem 1 is not based on the fact that 
distributions are defined on the real line. In fact, the theorem applies to any set of 
probability distributions, defined on an arbitrary sample space, (e.g., the results of an 
election, the outcome of a game) provided it is closed under a well-defined operation of 
convolution. 
The present system of risk is closely related to the classical extensive system that 
provides the axiomatic basis for the measurement of physical properties such as weight, 
length, and time. Such a system is based on an ordering of physical objects with respect 
to some property (e.g., weight) and on a physical operation of concatenation (e.g., 
placing two objects together on a pan balance). Under this interpretation of the 
ordering and the operation, the present axioms reduce to the well-known physical 
principles that govern the measurement of weight. 
One essential difference, however, between a risk system and an extensive system is 
that the latter is typically nonnegative, in the sense that A 0 B > A for all A and B, 
and the measurement scale is, consequently, nonnegative. The present system, on the 
other hand, admits negative values since the convolution of two distributions may be 
less risky than either one of them. The risk scale, therefore, may take both positive and 
negative values. In particular, since R(A 0 4) = R(A) + R(4) = &A) then R(4) = 0. 
Consequently, any option that is less risky than the status quo must have a negative 
risk value. 
As a corollary to Theorem 1 we show how the risk of degenerate distributions 
(i.e., distributions where a single value is obtained with probability one) is determined. 
Let Kr and K, denote degenerate distributions which yield the values K, and K, , 
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respectively, with probability one. Since Kr 0 K, is a degenerate distribution that 
yields the value k, + k, with probability one, we can identify each degenerate 
distribution K with its value k. By the additivity of the risk scale R(K, o K2) = 
R(K,) + R(K,), hence R(k, + R,) = R(K,) + R(k,) for any real k, , k, . Consequently, 
it can be shown that R(K) = /3K for some real /3. I f  /3 = 0, then R(K) = 0 for any 
degenerate distribution K, and hence the risk measure is translation-invariant in the 
sense that R(A 0 K) = R(A) + R(K) = R(A) for all A. If  /3 # 0, then degenerate 
distributions are bound to have negative or positive risk values. 
These aspects of the theory are somewhat at variance with ordinary usage of risk 
according to which there is no negative risk, and sure-things (i.e., degenerate distri- 
butions) are regarded as having no risk. To illustrate the significance of negative risks 
in our theory, note that the gamble A = (200, 4; -200, 4) is likely to be judged 
(by most people) as riskier than the gamble B = (300, 4; -100, $), which is con- 
structed by adding a sure-thing to A. Consequently, the option of receiving 100 for 
sure must have negative risk. 
The above example suggests that the addition of a positive sure-thing to an option 
cannot increase its risk. Stated as a formal assumption we obtain 
A5 POSITIVITY. I f  K is a degenerate distribution with k > 0 then A > A 0 K 
for all A in 5’. 
In the following discussion, we introduce additional assumptions about the risk 
ordering and study the constraints they impose on the risk scale. Let E(A) denote the 
expectation of A, and let tA denote the distribution obtained by multiplying all values 
of A by some real number t. (For continuous distributions the density function of tA 
has to be normalized.) Using this construct, we introduce 
A6 MONOTONICITY. For all A, B in S with E(A) = E(B) = 0 and for any real 
t>l 
(i) til > iz 
(ii) A $ B if and only if tA 2 tB. 
Axiom 6 asserts that, for distributions with zero expectation, risk increases with multi- 
plication by any t > 1, and that the risk ordering is preserved upon multiplication 
by a positive real number. Thus, part (i) of the monotonicity axiom asserts that any 
fair bet whose outcomes are dollars, for example, is riskier than the bet obtained from 
it by changing the dollars to nickels. Similarly, part (ii) states that the risk ordering 
between gambles is independent of the denomination of the payoffs (e.g., dollars, 
nickels) provided their expectations are zero. We regard part (i) of A6, like A5, as a 
necessary assumption for any theory of risk. On the other hand, part (ii) of A6, like A2, 
is a more powerful assumption that is both appealing and testable. 
Our last axiom is more technical in nature. A sequence {A,) n = 1, 2,..., of distri- 
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butions is said to approach a limiting distribution A, whenever Pr(x < A, < y) 
approaches Pr(x < A < y) as n --f co for any real X, y. 
A7 CONTINUITY. I f  {An} approaches A then R(A,) approaches R(A), provided 
E(A,) = E(A) and V(A,) = V(A) f  or all n, where V(A) denotes the variance of A. 
Axiom 7 establishes the continuity of the risk scale in the sense that if all the distri- 
butions in the sequence have the same mean and variance then lim R(A,) = R(A) 
whenever lim{A,} = A. To summarize the added assumptions we introduce a new 
definition. A risk system (S, 0, >) is called a regular risk system if it satisfies Axioms 5, 
6, and 7. 
To study the properties of a regular risk system, select some A, B in S such that 
E(A) = E(B) = 0, and Z’(A) > V(B). Let A, = (n * A)/dn. and B, = (n * B)/qn, 
see A4 for the definition of *. As n + cc the sequences {A,} and {B,} approach, 
respectively, limiting distributions A’ and B’ which, by the central limit theorem, are 
normal with E(A’) = E(B’) = 0 and V(A’) = V(A) > V(B) = V(B’). Since 
A’ = kB’ for some k > 1, then, by Axiom 6(i), A’ > B’ and by Theorem 1, 
R(A’) > R(B’). By Axiom 7, however, there exists an n such that R(A,) > R(B,), 
hence A, > B, . Consequently, by Axiom 6(ii), n * A > n * B, and by Axiom 2, 
A > B. Recalling Theorem 1, we write A > B if and only if R(A) 3 R(B) if and 
only if V(A) 3 V(B) for all A, B with zero expectation. 
Thus, there exists a strictly increasing function, f,  such that, for any A in S with 
E(A) = 0, R(A) =f[V(A)]. Note that the set of distributions with zero expectation 
is closed under 0. Furthermore, it follows from the definition of variance and Theorem 1, 
respectively, that both V and R are additive over 0. Hence, if E(A) = E(B) = 0 
then R(A 0 B) =f[V(A 0 WI =f[V(A) + V(B)], 
and R(A 0 B) = R(A) + R(B) =W(A)l +f[W)]. 
It follows from the above functional equation thatfis linear; thus, there exists some 
01 > 0 such that R(A) = f[V(A)] = ocV(A), whenever E(A) = 0. 
Finally, for any A in S, define A, by the equation A = A, 0 [E(A)], where [E(A)] 
is the degenerate distribution where the value E(A) is obtained with probability one. 
Consequently, 
R(A) = R(A, o [E(A)]) = R(A,) + R([E(A)]) = orV(A) + PE(A), since E(A,) = 0 
and V(A,) = V(A), where p < 0, by Axiom 5. Since the unit of the risk scale is 
arbitrary we can divide the above equation by a - j3 and let 19 = ,/a - /3. We have 
thus established 
THEOREM 2. If(S, 0, 2) is a regular risk system, then there exists a unique 0 < B < 1 
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such that for all A, B in S (with jinite expectations and variances) A > B ;f and only ;f  
R(A) 2 R(B) where R(A) = BP’(A) - (1 - 0) E(A). 
Thus, in a regular risk system, the risk ordering is generated by a linear combination 
of expectation and variance. Put differently, the risk of any option can be readily 
computed, once a single parameter, 0, is determined. Furthermore, B is attainable 
from a single judgment of risk-equality between two distinct distributions, and its 
value determines the relative contribution of the expectation and the variance to the 
riskiness of an option. 
The result established in Theorem 2 is surprisingly strong. Although the validity of 
the critical assumptions, A2 and A6(ii), is not self-evident, they seem compatible with 
our intuitions of risk. Furthermore, the cancellation axiom (A2), for example, is an 
appealing consistency principle that one may wish to impose on his risk ordering. In 
this sense, the cancellation axiom may have normative application as a guideline in 
establishing a risk ordering, similar to the application of axioms of expected utility 
theory in establishing a preference ordering. 
The evaluation of the adequacy of the present theory is a difficult task, since our 
intuitions concerning risk are not very clear and a satisfactory operational definition 
of the risk ordering is not easily obtainable. Indeed, the existence of a meaningful risk 
ordering (that has been presupposed by all workers in the field) should not be taken for 
granted. 
III. RISK AND PREFERENCE 
The present results provide a quantitative explication of risk by demonstrating that, 
under the assumptions of the theory, risk is expressible as a linear combination of 
expectation and variance. That expectation and variance, however, are two essential 
components of risk has long been realized by many investigators. 
In his monograph entitled “Portfolio Selection,” Markowitz (1959, p. 129) defines 
a portfolio (i.e., a probability distribution over monetary values) as ineficz’ent if “it is 
possible to obtain higher expected (or average) return with no greater variability 
of return.” Markowitz does not offer any formal rationale for his definition of efficiency; 
instead he describes various methods for finding efficient portfolios. To cast the above 
definition in the present framework, let T be a subset of S. A distribution A in T is 
inefficient (with respect to T) if there exists a B in T such that R(A) > R(B) for any 
0 < 0 ,< 1. Thus, a portfolio is inefficient (in T) if it is riskier than some other portfolio 
for all admissible values of 0. Additional applications and further discussions of criteria 
for preference among options that are based only on their expectations and variances 
(or standard deviations) have been presented by Baumol (1963), Lintner (1965), 
Sharpe (1963) and Tobin (1958); see also Hanoch and Levy (1969). 
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We are led now to the more general and basic problem of the relationships between 
risk and preference. In the economic and business literature, it has been typically 
assumed that people wish to minimize risk, which can, therefore, be inferred from 
preference. Some psychologists, on the other hand, have argued that the relation- 
ships between risk and preference are considerably more complicated. Indeed, one 
advantage of an explicit theory of risk is that it enables one to investigate the relation- 
ships between preference and risk in detail. 
A preference function, f,  is any real-valued function on S such that for all A and B, 
f(A) > f  (B) if and only if A is preferred to B. A preference function is, therefore, 
an ordinal utility scale, i.e., a numerical scale that reflects a given preference order. 
A preference order is said to depend on the risk measure, or to be R-dependent if there 
exists a function g satisfyingf(A) = g[R(A)] = g[OV(A) - (I - 8) E(A)] for all ,4 
in S. Thus, preferences are R-dependent whenever any two equally-risky options are 
indifferent. A preference order is VE-dependent if it depends only on the variance 
and the expectation, i.e., if there exists a real-valued function, h, in two arguments 
such that f  (A) = h[V(A), E(A)] f  or all A in S. Thus, preferences are VE-dependent 
whenever any two options with equal variances and expectations are indifferent. 
Clearly, any preference order that is R-dependent is also VE-dependent, but the 
converse is not true. Markowitz’s (1959) model for the selection of efficient portfolios 
provides one example of VE-dependent preferences. 
The major theory of decision making under risk is the expected utility theory. 
According to this theory, which was formulated by Bernoulli (1738) and first axiom- 
atized by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944), there exists a real-valued function, u, 
that assigns a utility to each outcome. An option A is preferred to option B, according 
to the theory, if and only if E(uA) > E(Q), where E(uA) is the expectation of the 
distribution uA whose values are the utilities of the corresponding values of A. What 
are the relationships between R-dependency, VE-dependency and the theory of 
expected utility ? 
We assume that utility theory is satisfied for any set of distributions and that the 
utility function is sufficiently regular so that it can be expanded in a power series. 
Using these assumptions, it is possible to show, following Borch (1963), Markowitz 
(1959), and Tobin (1958), that the quadratic utility function generates the only 
preference order that is VE-dependent, and that no utility function generates a 
preference order that is R-dependent. 
THEOREM 3. If  expected utility theory holds, and u(a) = C,“=, &an then 
(i) a preference order is I/E-dependent if and only if 
u(a) = t, + t,a + &a’, 
(ii) there exists no preference order that is R-dependent. 
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Proof. (i) First, suppose U(U) = f, + t,a + t2u2, hence 
E(UA) = qto + t,A + t2A2) 
= t, + t&q + t,E(A2) 
= t, + t,E(A) + tz[V) + E(A)“1 
= wq4, q41 
and hence the order is VE-dependent. Second, by assumption, u(a) = I,“=, t,p, 
hence E(u,J = C,“=, t,E(k). Assuming the preference order is VE-dependent, we 
can write E(u~) = h[V(A), E(A)] = h[E(A2) - E(J2, E(A)]. Hence t, = 0 for any 
n > 2, in the power series expansion of U. Otherwise, we can always select some A, 
B with equal expectations and variances but unequal expected utilities, contrary to our 
assumption. Consequently, E(u~) = t, + t,E(A) + t2E(A2) and U(U) = t, + t,u + t2u2 
which completes the proof of part (i). 
To prove (ii), suppose there exists a preference order compatible with expected 
utility theory that is R-dependent. Hence, 
@,A = .dW)I = gIlW’(A) - (1 - 0) -W)I, 0<0<1. 
= g[flE(A2) - BE(J2 - (1 - 0) E(A)]. 
But E(u,J = t, + t,E(A) + t2E(A2), by part (i) since R-dependency implies 
VE-dependency. There is no g, however, satisfying the above equation. To demon- 
strate, let E(A) = 0, henceg[BE(A2)] = t, + t2E(A2) for any value of E(A2) andg must 
be linear. Letting V(A) = 0, however, yieldsg[(B - 1) E(A)] = t, + &E(A) + t,E(N). 
Hence t, = 0 contrary to Axiom 6(i) w ic h’ h completes the proof of the theorem. 
The latter part of Theorem 3 shows that there is no utility function compatible with 
a preference order that is R-dependent. This result may be taken, therefore, as 
evidence either against the present theory of risk or against expected utility theory. 
Alternatively, one may accept both theories and reject the notion that preferences are 
R-dependent. It seems reasonable to suppose that preferences do not depend solely 
on risk, and that an individual may not be indifferent between two options that appear 
equally risky to him. Similarly, it seems plausible that an individual may perceive one 
option as riskier than another, although he may be indifferent between the two. 
This does not mean, of course, that risk and preference are unrelated, only that one 
ordering cannot be inferred from the order. 
The first part of Theorem 3 shows that the only utility function that is 
compatible with a preference order that is VE-dependent is of the general 
form U(U) = t, + t,u + t,a2. The quadratic utility function, however, is not very 
satisfactory. First, its domain must be bounded, since for u to be an increasing function, 
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a must be bounded by -t,/2t, from above or below depending on whether t, is negative 
or positive. Second, it is inevitable decreasing marginal utility must obtain for suitably 
large amounts of money that the utility function be concave (i.e., U” < 0) somewhere, 
hence t, < 0. In this case, however, the degree of risk aversion (defined by 
-u”/u’) increases with an increase in assets as pointed out by Pratt (1964, p. 132). 
Hence, according to this function, the cash-equivalence (or the minimal selling price) 
of a gamble decreases as one gets wealthier. This conclusion seems unacceptable on 
both empirical and theoretical counts. 
Returning to the relationship between the quadratic utility function and the function 
h( I/, E), we note that for any fixed value of E, h is either an increasing or a decreasing 
function of I’ depending on whether t, > 0 or t, < 0. Stated formally, we obtain 
COROLLARY. Suppose a preference order is VE-dependent and also satisfies expected 
utility theory. Then the preference order of any set of options with equal expectation must 
either minimize or maximize variance. 
The method employed in proving Theorem 3 can also be used to obtain a more 
general result. Suppose the risk of A is expressible as some function of the first n (raw) 
moments of A. Theorem 3 can, then, be easily extended to show that if there exists a 
utility function that is compatible with the proposed risk measure, then it must be a 
polynomial function of degree n. 
One aspect of distributions that does not appear in the present theory is skewness. 
It may nevertheless be true that some gambles with negative skewness appear riskier 
than gambles with positive skewness even when expectation and variance are held 
constant. I f  skewness does, indeed, play an essential role in determining the perception 
of risk, then the range of applicability of the present theory should be restricted, e.g., to 
symmetric or equally-skewed options. In this case, one may attempt to generalize the 
present theory in order to account for the effects of skewness (or of other such factors) 
on the perceived riskiness of options. 
There have been several experimental studies (e.g., Coombs and Pruitt, 1960; 
Edwards, 1954; Lichtenstein, 1965, and Pollatsek, 1966) that examined the variance 
preference hypothesis. This hypothesis (which can be regarded as a special case of 
Coombs’ unfolding theory) states that, for any given expectation level, each individual 
has an ideal, or a most preferred, variance level. In selecting among gambles with 
equal expectation, therefore, individuals select the gamble whose variance is closest to 
their ideal variance level. The preceding discussion showed, however, that the 
minimization or the maximization of variance are the only forms of variance preferences 
admissible under expected utility theory. Unfortunately, the empirical evidence for 
systematic variance preferences is inconclusive. Yet, to the extent that the data provide 
evidence for consistent preferences for intermediate variance levels, they also provide 
evidence against the theory of expected utility, contrary to the views expressed by some 
writers. 
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In addition to research on the relationships between risk and preference, there has 
been some research on the perception of risk per se. Recently, Coombs and Huang 
(1969) have developed a “psychophysical” theory of risk that expresses the riskiness 
of a gamble as a composite function of its components. The authors have limited their 
discussion to two-outcome gambles of the form G = (y, p; Z, 1 - p), where one winsy 
with probability p and z with probability 1 -p. Three classes of transformations of 
such gambles, denoted 01, /3, and y, were defined as follows. al(G) is a transformation 
that increases V(G) by increasing the range of the outcomes, while leaving p and E(G) 
unchanged; /I(G) is G 0 6, where b is some constant that is added to both outcomes; 
and r(G) is c * G, that is, the gamble obtained by c independent plays of the gamble G. 
Starting from the zero gamble (0, p; 0, 1 - p), one applies to it the transformations cy, 
/3, and y  in turn. The result is a new gamble, G, that can be characterized by a triple 
(a, b, c), where a is the increase in variance due to the transformation 01, b is the 
increase in expectation due to the transformation ,6, and c is the number of independent 
multiple plays of the resulting gamble. Coombs and Huang have proposed a distri- 
butive polynomial model for the measurement of risk. According to this model, 
there exist real-valued functions fi , f3 , and fs such that the risk of (a, b, c) equals 
D&4 +h@)l h(c). Letting h(x) = i f t x or i = 1, 2, 3 with t, , t, > 0 > t, yields 
Risk (G) = Risk (a, b. c) 
= (t,a + t&J) I&, by hypothesis 
= &T/I(G) + t&!?(G), since V(G) = UC and E(G) = bc. 
= tW(G) - t(1 - 0) E(G), t1 where 0 = ~ 
t, - t,’ 
t = t,(t, - t*). 
Hence, for the special class of gambles considered by Coombs and Huang (1969), 
their theory reduces to the present theory under the above linearity assumption. 
Furthermore, the supporting empirical evidence for the distributive model presented 
by Coombs and Huang (I 969), based on rank ordering of gambles with respect to risk, 
also provides empirical support for the present theory. 
The present theory of risk has two interrelated objectives. First, it provides a 
testable psychological model for the measurement of risk. It is not, however, a 
fundamental measurement model in the classical sense, since it presupposes the 
representation of options as distributions on the real line. On the other hand, it 
bypasses the measurement problem altogether since, under the assumptions of the 
model, the risk scale, R, is known in advance except for a single parameter, 8.3 Second, 
3 The present theory has been formulated in terms of probability distributions over monetary 
values. It is conceivable, however, that the present axioms will fail to hold for this representation 
of the outcomes but will be satisfied when applied to probability distributions over some other 
representation of the outcomes such as a nonlinear utility or subjective value scale. In the latter 
case, the empirical interpretation of the convolution operation becomes more involved, since 
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it provides an explication of risk, that is, it offers a quantitative concept of risk as a 
substitute for the more familiar, but vaguer, notion of degree of risk. Furthermore, 
the proposed concept of risk is not only precise, but it is also sufficiently similar to the 
intuitive concept, so that it may capture most of its essential characteristics. The use of 
Shannon and Weaver’s (1949) in f  ormation measure as a quantitative explication for the 
concept of the amount of information (see Roberts and Lute, 1968) is a case in point. 
In both instances one starts with an ordering of probability distributions with respect 
to some property (risk or information) and shows that, under certain assumptions, an 
essentially unique index, of risk or information, can be derived. 
The value of the present model depends, therefore, on the empirical validity of the 
axioms, as well as on the theoretical usefulness of the derived measure. 
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